The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism

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Autor principal: Ogundiwin, Aderonke Adeyinka
Formato: Tesis
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: Obafemi Awolowo University 2019
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Acceso en línea:https://ir.oauife.edu.ng/handle/123456789/4063
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author Ogundiwin, Aderonke Adeyinka
author_facet Ogundiwin, Aderonke Adeyinka
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spelling oai:ir.oauife.edu.ng:123456789-40632023-05-13T11:27:49Z The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism Ogundiwin, Aderonke Adeyinka Epistemic reliabilism Epistemic Reliabilism Pragmatic theory Pseudo-problems x,123p The study identified and characterised reliabilism as a theory of epistemic justification. It identified and examined problems that were raised against reliabilism. It also assessed epistemic reliabilism from the viewpoint of belief-forming processes. This was with a view to presenting reliabilism as a viable theory of epistemic justification. The study employed both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary source comprised a close reading of Alvin I. Goldman’s“Process Reliabilism”, Earl Conee and Richard Feldman’s “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism” , Alvin Goldman’s“Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology”, JarretLeplin’s“In Defense of Reliabilism”, Michael Levin’s “You Can Always Count on Reliabilism”, Kent Bach’s “A Rationale for Reliabilism”, Peter J. Markie’sGoldman’s New Reliabilism”, Richard Foley’s “What’s Wrong with Reliabilism?”, Stephen K. McLeod’s “Rationalism and Modal Knowledge”, Eric J. Olsson’s “Reliabilism, Stability and the Value of Knowledge”, and Jonathan Vogel’s “Reliabilism Leveled”. The secondary source included books, journal articles and the Internet. The data collected were subjected to conceptual analysis and philosophical argumentation. The results showed that epistemic reliabilism was an adequate theory of justification. The study found that bootstrapping, swamping and the new evil demon problem were unfounded when assessed in relation to the belief-formation principle of reliabilism. It also found that in spite of the generality problem and the problem of induction and circularity which raised intense criticisms against reliabilism, a clear identification of the principles of belief-formation, epistemic rationality and the notion of genuine option makes them minimally avoidable. The study concluded that the swamping, bootstrapping and the new evil demon problems were not sufficient to destroy epistemic reliabilism. It also concluded that epistemic reliabilism was a viable and pragmatic theory of epistemic justification. 2019-03-15T09:37:18Z 2019-03-15T09:37:18Z 2015 Thesis Ogundiwin A A.(2015).The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism https://ir.oauife.edu.ng/handle/123456789/4063 en application/pdf Obafemi Awolowo University
spellingShingle Epistemic reliabilism
Epistemic
Reliabilism
Pragmatic theory
Pseudo-problems
Ogundiwin, Aderonke Adeyinka
The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism
title The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism
title_full The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism
title_fullStr The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism
title_full_unstemmed The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism
title_short The pseudo-problems of epistemic reliabilism
title_sort pseudo problems of epistemic reliabilism
topic Epistemic reliabilism
Epistemic
Reliabilism
Pragmatic theory
Pseudo-problems
url https://ir.oauife.edu.ng/handle/123456789/4063
work_keys_str_mv AT ogundiwinaderonkeadeyinka thepseudoproblemsofepistemicreliabilism
AT ogundiwinaderonkeadeyinka pseudoproblemsofepistemicreliabilism